Shark Fin Sales Elimination Act (2022) — A US Federal Ban on the Fin Trade

Jurisdiction: US Federal Law or Treaty: Shark Fin Sales Elimination Act of 2022 (enacted as part of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. 117-263); amends the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Last verified: 2026-05-24


Summary

In December 2022, the Shark Fin Sales Elimination Act became U.S. federal law (enacted as a provision of the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act) [Pub. L. 117-263]. The law makes it illegal to possess, buy, sell, or transport shark fins or any product containing shark fins in the United States, with limited exceptions for dogfish and for fins lawfully taken and retained for non-commercial scientific or educational purposes.

The law addressed a gap that prior US law had left open. The Shark Conservation Act of 2010 had banned the practice of shark finning (removing fins at sea and discarding the body) in US waters by requiring sharks to be landed with fins naturally attached. But it did not ban the trade in fins — so fins could still be legally bought and sold in the US, including imported fins from countries with weaker or no finning protections. The 2022 Act closes that trade entirely, removing the US market from the global fin supply chain [Oceana 2022].

This brief is a case study in closing a trade-side loophole that an earlier practice-side law had left open.


What the law does

The Shark Fin Sales Elimination Act [Pub. L. 117-263, Division relevant sections]:

  • Prohibits the possession, sale, purchase, transport, or trade of shark fins or products containing shark fins anywhere in the United States
  • Exempts spiny dogfish (Squalus acanthias), a sustainably-managed US fishery, from the prohibition
  • Exempts fins lawfully retained for non-commercial scientific research, education, or for individuals holding specific state licenses for limited purposes
  • Sets civil penalties of up to $100,000 (or the fair market value of the fins involved, whichever is greater) per violation
  • Builds on existing federal enforcement through NOAA Fisheries Office of Law Enforcement and the Magnuson-Stevens Act framework

The law made the US one of a number of jurisdictions (alongside more than a dozen US states that had already enacted their own fin-trade bans, and several countries) to remove its domestic market from the global fin trade.


The problem it addressed

Shark finning and the fin trade are a principal driver of global shark population decline. Key facts establishing the problem:

  • An estimated 63–273 million sharks per year are killed in commercial fisheries globally, with the fin trade a major economic driver [Worm et al. 2013]
  • The dried-fin trade is centered on East Asian markets (Hong Kong SAR and mainland China the principal hubs), where shark-fin soup is a traditional luxury dish
  • More than one-third of all shark and ray species are threatened with extinction (IUCN), with overfishing — much of it fin-driven — the primary cause [Dulvy et al. 2021]
  • The 2010 US Shark Conservation Act banned finning in US waters but left the fin trade legal, meaning the US remained a market for fins (including imports from countries with no finning protections), undermining the conservation intent

The 2022 Act removes the US from the demand side of the global fin trade entirely.


Who is accountable

This brief names no individual defendants. The accountability framework:

  • NOAA Fisheries Office of Law Enforcement — primary enforcement agency under the Magnuson-Stevens Act framework
  • U.S. Customs and Border Protection — interdicts fin shipments at ports of entry
  • U.S. Department of Justice — prosecutes violations

The law was the product of sustained advocacy by Oceana, the Humane Society, the Animal Welfare Institute, and many marine-conservation organizations, with bipartisan congressional sponsorship, building on the precedent set by the dozen-plus US states that had enacted their own fin bans (beginning with Hawaii in 2010).


What worked

  • Closing the trade-side loophole. The 2010 finning ban addressed the practice in US waters; the 2022 trade ban addresses the market. Together they remove both the US-waters supply and the US-market demand from the global fin trade. This is the structurally complete version of the policy.
  • The dogfish exemption preserves a genuinely sustainably-managed US fishery (spiny dogfish is MSC-certified in some US fisheries) while banning the broader trade — a defensible line that avoided a legitimate-fishery objection to the law.
  • Building on a state-level foundation. More than a dozen US states had already banned the fin trade; the federal law harmonised the national standard and closed the interstate-commerce gap, preventing fins from flowing through states without bans.
  • Market-signal effect. A US federal fin-trade ban contributes to the broader international trend of jurisdictions removing themselves from the fin supply chain, incrementally reducing the global market.

What failed / remains incomplete

  • The US was a relatively small share of the global fin market. The dominant markets are in East Asia; the US ban removes a meaningful but not decisive portion of global demand. The law's global conservation effect depends on it contributing to a broader multi-jurisdiction trend rather than acting alone.
  • Enforcement at ports. As with all trade bans, effectiveness depends on CBP and NOAA detection capacity. Fins can be mislabeled or concealed; species identification of dried fins requires expertise or DNA testing.
  • It does not address bycatch mortality. Many sharks die as bycatch in fisheries targeting other species (tuna, swordfish) regardless of whether their fins enter trade. The fin-trade ban reduces the targeted-finning incentive but does not address the larger bycatch-mortality problem (see the NRWL NOAA Fisheries Observer Program brief).
  • CITES + RFMO measures remain the larger lever. For globally-traded shark species, CITES Appendix II listings (expanded substantially at CoP19 in 2022) and Regional Fishery Management Organisation bycatch rules affect a far larger share of the trade than any single national market ban.

What readers can do

  • Never consume shark-fin soup or any shark-fin product — including in countries where it remains legal. The dish is the demand driver for the global fin trade.
  • Do not eat shark meat of uncertain species. DNA studies repeatedly find threatened and CITES-listed shark species mislabeled in shark-meat commerce; avoiding shark meat entirely is the safe choice.
  • Support Oceana and the marine-conservation organizations that drove the law and continue to work on shark conservation internationally.
  • Choose MSC-certified seafood and use Seafood Watch ratings, which flag high-shark-bycatch fisheries.
  • Engage on CITES and RFMO shark measures — these affect a far larger share of the global trade than national bans. The CoP19 (2022) expansion of CITES Appendix II shark listings was a major step; supporting its enforcement matters.
  • Support the international spread of fin-trade bans. The US ban is most effective as part of a multi-jurisdiction trend; advocacy organizations working on fin-trade bans in other major markets (the EU, the UK, Canada — Canada banned fin imports/exports in 2019) advance the cumulative effect.

References

  • Dulvy, N. K., Pacoureau, N., Rigby, C. L., et al. (2021). Overfishing drives over one-third of all sharks and rays toward a global extinction crisis. Current Biology 31(21): 4773–4787.
  • Oceana (2022). Shark Fin Sales Elimination Act becomes law. https://oceana.org/
  • Shark Fin Sales Elimination Act of 2022, enacted within the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for FY2023, Pub. L. 117-263 (December 2022). Amends the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.
  • Worm, B., Davis, B., Kettemer, L., et al. (2013). Global catches, exploitation rates, and rebuilding options for sharks. Marine Policy 40: 194–204.

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